I think the Hard Problem is inherently unsolvable, because we first have to agree that it's a problem at all. Your position starts by assuming that conscious experiences cannot be identical to the brain activities that produce them, but are only correlated with them. I and others reject that assumption, believing that our conscious experiences are, in fact, identical to the brain activities that produce them. Your use of the term "brain states" rather than "brain activities" is misleadingly. Our brains are extremely active organs, changing all the time; when they are in fixed states, we are dead.

Your rejection of physical "reductionist" arguments, it seems to me, is unwarranted, because increasingly complex physical structures can indeed give rise to new properties that are impossible for us to explain or predict in detail in practice (i.e. with affordable time and other resources) from properties of their more basic constitutuents. Properties of a fire are, in practice, almost impossible to explained from properties of the individual atoms and molecules involved. And properties of the global internet of computers, such as its specific effects, such as ones on the behavior of the individual computers that make it up, are practically (that is, in practice, given an affordable amount of time and other resources) impossible to explain or predict from the properties of the individual components.

Or, to take another, older, example, the specific behavior of groups of millions of people is impossible to explain from properties of individual people. Why did certain events of history occur the way they did? Clearly they emerged from individual human behavior, but in practically unpredictable ways, some involving random actions like assassinations of leading individuals and the consequences that flowed from those events. It's, in practice, impossible to capture all of the information that went into all of the individuals involved in making their individual decisions to act, but it does not follow from that that consequent events were not causally related to those individual decisions.